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1. Introduction 
We study how the choice of peers impacts CEO compensation. Corporations commonly 
use peer companies to help determine compensation packages for CEOs, an approach known as 
benchmarking. Recent papers by Faulkender and Yang (2010) and Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen 
(2011) (FY and BLN, respectively) show that, after controlling for similarities between a firm 
and its chosen peers, firms are more likely to include in their peer group those companies that 
have higher paid CEOs than those with lower paid CEOs. We label the difference between the 
pay of the selected peers and the propensity-score-matched peers as the “peer pay effect.” As 
discussed in FY and BLN, an interpretation for this result is that the peer pay effect reflects 
firms’ self-serving behavior, in which highly paid peers are selected to justify higher CEO pay. 
Alternatively, as we elaborate below, the peer pay effect could represent a reward for unobserved 
CEO talent, which captures managerial success in managing complex organizations and in 
achieving high firm performance. We test this hypothesis. 
A number of studies argue that the pay-setting process has strayed far from the arm’s 
length model assumed in most economic models of pay arrangements. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 
2004, 2005) claim that flawed compensation packages are widespread, persistent, and 
systematic. Compensation critics argue that peer pay is used as a mechanism to justify 
excessively high CEO pay (e.g., Crystal, 1991; Morgenson, 2006). According to this view, firms 
benchmark their CEO pay against strategically selected, higher-CEO-paying peers to justify 
awarding their CEOs high compensation. This is possible because peer choice is partly 
influenced by firm executives.1 Consistent with this view, BLN (p. 538) conclude that “peer 
                                                 
1 Determining CEO compensation is the responsibility of the board of directors’ compensation committee. One 
input into the determination of executive pay is a set of peers used to benchmark executive compensation. These 
peers are usually suggested by the compensation committee, often under the guidance of a compensation consulting 
firm. Based on Reda et al. (2007) and discussions with compensation consultants, executives typically review and 
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groups are constructed in a manner that biases compensation upward.” Similarly, FY (p. 259) 
state that “compensation committees seem to be endorsing compensation peer groups that 
include companies with higher CEO compensation, everything else equal, possibly because such 
peer companies enable justification of the high level of their CEO pay.”  
Self-serving behavior, however, is unlikely to wholly explain the peer pay effect. For 
example, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that competitive compensation packages are 
driven by market forces, such as the supply and demand for CEO talent, and that benchmarking 
enables firms to gauge the “market compensation” for their CEO. Consistent with this argument, 
Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) study the effect of peer choice on pay and provide support 
for the idea that peer pay serves to gauge the market wage necessary to retain valuable human 
capital. Using a sample of implicit (as opposed to actual) peers during the pre-Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure regulation period, they show that increases in CEO pay 
attributable to peer selection are more consistent with tighter labor markets than with self-serving 
behavior. We extend Bizjak et al. (2008) by studying the extent to which the peer pay effect 
represents a reward for CEO talent that is not fully captured by similarities in firm 
characteristics. In other words, we contribute to this literature by studying the relative extent to 
which the peer pay effect reflects self-serving behavior or a reward for CEO talent. 
Several arguments support a talent-based explanation for the peer pay effect. Theoretical 
predictions from standard agency and competitive sorting models recognize that differences in 
CEO ability have an important role in contract design (e.g., Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Rosen, 
1982; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, 2009; Pan, 2010). Further, a 
large number of empirical studies show that differences in human capital across executives affect 
                                                                                                                                                             
provide feedback on the choice of peers, part of which may include executives’ views on peers that should be 
excluded as well as those peers that should be added to the final set.  
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compensation, firm performance, and management style. For example, Milbourn (2003) and 
Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2011) find evidence consistent with CEO compensation reflecting the 
board’s perception of the CEO’s ability or reputation. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) find that the 
inclusion of manager fixed-effects explains a significant portion of the variation in CEO pay and 
they conclude that unobservable differences in human capital across executives are an important 
determinant of CEO compensation (see also Coles and Li, 2010; Demerjian, Lev, and McVay, 
2012). Finally, albeit anecdotally, when firms describe their choice of peers in their proxy 
statements, they often specifically refer to the need to compete for executive talent (see the 
Appendix for some examples).  
As the first step towards assessing the extent to which a firm benchmarks to higher paid 
peers, we follow FY and BLN and model firms’ choice of peers. Corroborating these studies, we 
show that firms choose peers of similar size, industry, profitability, and business complexity. 
After controlling for these similarities in firm characteristics, firms are more likely to choose 
peers that pay their CEOs higher compensation. FY and BLN interpret this result as a firm’s 
strategically selecting highly paid peers to justify higher pay for the CEO. While the analysis in 
FY and BLN controls for firm characteristics that drive the peer selection, it can only indirectly 
control for similarities in the demand and supply of CEO talent. This is because talent proxies at 
the CEO level are not available for all potential peers and thus cannot be included in the peer 
selection model. This creates the possibility that the peer pay effect could reflect CEO talent that 
is uncontrolled for in the model. Our methodology allows us to circumvent this issue by 
controlling for CEO-level characteristics after a sample of propensity-matched peers is 
determined. 
We define the peer pay effect as the percentage difference between the compensation of 
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the actual firm-chosen peers and the compensation of a propensity-matched sample of peers, in 
which peers are matched based on the similarity of firm characteristics. The mean total peer pay 
effect in our sample is 0.133 (0.037) using the FY (BLN) specification, indicating that the mean 
firm chooses peers that pay their CEOs 13.3% (3.7%) more. In dollar terms, the difference 
between the CEO pay in selected peers versus predicted peers in our sample equals $896,000 
($463,000). These results are comparable to the peer pay effect shown in FY and BLN.  
To empirically disentangle whether firms’ tendency to select higher paying peers reflects 
self-serving behavior or pay for talent, we use multiple methods to decompose the peer pay 
effect into a component that proxies for CEO talent and one that proxies for self-serving 
behavior.  The talent component is proxied by the fitted value from a regression of the peer pay 
effect on proxies for CEO talent. Following prior literature, we proxy for CEO talent with the 
CEO’s historical abnormal stock and accounting performance, the market value of the firms that 
the CEO managed in the past, and the number of times the CEO is referred to in the business 
press (e.g., Milbourn, 2003; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2010; Fee and Hadlock, 2003; 
Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora, 2006; Gabaix and Landier, 2008). The self-serving component is 
proxied by the fitted value from a regression of the peer pay effect on proxies for weak corporate 
governance. Our proxies for self-serving behavior include three dimensions of governance used 
in prior literature: (i) board structure, (ii) antitakeover provisions, and (iii) ownership 
concentration (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008).   
Because the constructs of CEO talent and self-serving behavior are inherently difficult to 
measure, we relate these predicted and residual peer pay effect measures to future accounting 
and stock performance to validate their respective use as proxies for these constructs [see a 
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similar approach in Core et al. (1999)]. If the talent component captures CEO talent, then it 
should be associated with stronger future performance. In contrast, if the self-serving component 
captures strategic behavior, then it should be negatively associated with future performance. 
Consistent with these predictions, we find that the talent component of the peer pay effect is 
positively related to future performance, while the self-serving component is either unrelated or 
negatively related to future performance.  
We next investigate the extent to which the proxies for talent and self-serving behavior 
affect CEO pay. First, we confirm the FY and BLN findings that the peer pay effect is an 
incrementally important explanatory variable over and above established economic factors 
previously shown to explain CEO compensation (e.g., size, performance, growth, risk, etc.). This 
result provides evidence that firms engage in benchmarking to gauge the market compensation 
for the CEO. We then add the talent and self-serving components of the peer pay effect to the 
model predicting CEO compensation. We show that the talent component is positively associated 
with CEO compensation, consistent with firms benchmarking CEO pay to that of higher paying 
peers to attract and retain talented CEOs. The self-serving component is positively associated 
with CEO compensation in some, but not all, cases, and at lower magnitudes than that of talent. 
In terms of economic significance, the impact of the talent component on CEO pay is from two 
to almost ten times larger than is the impact of the self-serving component. As an illustration of 
the latter, a one-standard-deviation increase in the talent portion of the peer pay effect increases 
the total CEO compensation by up to $1,811,000, whereas the same effect for the self-serving 
component increases compensation by $184,000. Our results thus suggest that the majority of the 
effect of peer selection on CEO pay shown in FY and BLN can be interpreted as compensation 
for CEO talent.  
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We then conduct a series of sensitivity analyses on our decomposition of the peer pay 
effect into the talent and self-serving components. First, we include either historical CEO pay or 
the Graham et al. (2012) CEO fixed-effect measure as proxies for talent and obtain similar 
results. Second, our results are also robust to the use of several alternative proxies for weak 
governance structure as well as to controlling for firm characteristics that endogenously affect 
corporate governance. Finally, a recent study by Faulkender and Yang (2012) argues that peer 
manipulation in benchmarking practices has become more severe over time.  While we confirm 
their findings that the total peer pay effect increased over time, we show (consistent with our 
hypothesis) that the talent component remains the main driver of the peer pay effect over the 
sample time period.  
Our study contributes to a better understanding of the pay-setting process by extending 
the work of FY and BLN on the relation between peer choice and CEO compensation. We show 
that the peer pay effect identified in prior studies reflects, to a large extent, the need to reward 
CEOs for their intangible talent. While we show that self-serving behavior is also an explanation 
for the peer pay effect, our findings suggest that it represents a far less economically important 
explanation for the peer pay effect than does CEO talent. Thus, our conclusions are more in line 
with Holmstrom and Kaplan’s (2003) argument and Bizjak et al.’s (2008) findings that the effect 
of peer benchmarking on CEO pay is more consistent with the need to attract and retain skilled 
CEOs than it is with managerial entrenchment or weak corporate governance. Further, a 
contemporaneous study by Cadman and Carter (2011) also argues that the peer pay effect does 
not reflect self-serving behavior. The unique aspect of our paper, however, is that we are the first 
to provide evidence that the peer pay effect represents a reward for CEO talent. 
The next section describes the data collection and sample selection process. Our 
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empirical tests and results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Data and sample selection 
We first identify firms with data available on ExecuComp for fiscal year 2006 (mostly 
firms that comprise the Standard and Poors (S&P) 1500 index). For these firms, we download 
Definitive Proxy Statements (DEF14A) for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 that were filed with 
the SEC after December 15, 2006, the date when the disclosure requirement took effect (SEC, 
2006). Peer information is manually collected from the Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
(CD&A) section of the proxy statements. We read through the CD&As to ensure that the peer 
companies listed are the ones used for benchmarking purposes. This is important because peers 
can be used in other contexts. For example, about one-third of the firms disclosing peers for 
compensation benchmarking also disclose peers for relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
purposes. Approximately 20–30% of these firms use the same peer group for both compensation 
benchmarking and RPE (Black, Dikolli, and Hofmann, 2011; Gong, Li, and Shin, 2011). 
We obtain proxy statements for 4,217 firm-year observations. About 89% of these firms 
report using a group of peers, a compensation consultant database, or an index of firms to 
benchmark compensation. The remaining 11% of firms either explicitly mention that they do not 
use benchmarking or surveys to set compensation or that they do not disclose any information 
regarding the use of peers to benchmark compensation. For example, Zenith National Insurance 
states in its 2007 proxy statements that “the Compensation Committee does not utilize 
benchmarking or surveys or the services of compensation consultants, but relies on the 
experience and knowledge of its members.” Of the firms using peers, 418 firm-year observations 
do not explicitly report the names of the peers used (most of these cases pertain to proxy 
statements filed during the first year following the new disclosure requirements). Some of the 
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firms that do not explicitly disclose peers’ names benchmark either against indexes, such as the 
S&P 500 or the S&P Electric Utility index, or against a compensation consultant database. We 
further exclude 133 firm-year observations for which the number of peers was greater than 75 
because of the high data-collection cost per peer. For example, some firms listed the 300 peers 
included in a compensation consultant database.  
We collect financial and compensation information for each of the peers. Compensation 
data are obtained from both the ExecuComp and Morningstar databases. Like ExecuComp, 
Morningstar collects data reported by firms in proxy statements or 10-K filings with the 
SEC. The Morningstar database, however, provides executive compensation data for a much 
larger universe of U.S. companies. For example, for fiscal year 2005, Morningstar provides data 
on approximately 6,400 firms, including practically all of the approximately 1,900 firms in 
ExecuComp. Because peers are often not included in the ExecuComp database, we augment our 
compensation data with Morningstar, so that the final sample size is approximately double. As a 
result, our sample consists of 3,158 firm-years and 45,281 firm-year-peer observations (from 
1,273 unique disclosing firms and 1,972 unique peers) estimating the peer choice models. This 
sample is then reduced to 2,836 firm-years for the analysis on the decomposition of the peer pay 
effect (Table 3) and 2,158 firm-years for the analysis on performance and compensation (Tables 
4 to 7) due to additional data requirements. Note that in Table 6, the number of observations 
drops further in some tests because of additional data requirements. Our sample is larger than the 
samples in FY and BLN, which consist of 657 and 707 disclosing firms, respectively. The 
differences in the sample come from (i) the longer time-series in our data and (ii) our use of 
Morningstar data to obtain the compensation of peer firms. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the 
sample selection. 
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Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the number of peers disclosed per firm. The 
median firm has approximately 16 peers with available data to perform the analysis. In addition, 
there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the number of peers disclosed per firm. The 5th 
(95th) percentile equals six (36) peers per disclosing firm. 
3. Empirical tests and results 
 This section describes our analyses. Our analyses first replicate FY and BLN and 
examine the effect of firm characteristics and peers’ CEO pay in explaining peer choice. Then 
we decompose the peer pay effect into a component that reflects CEO talent and one that reflects 
self-serving behavior. We follow by investigating the extent to which the talent and self-serving 
components lead to higher CEO pay. Finally, we perform a series of robustness tests. 
3.1. Firms’ peer selection 
To examine the peer pay effect in our sample, we estimate various specifications of the 
following regression: 
Peerijt = α + Σ βm Firm characteristicm,ijt + δ Peer payijt + εijt, (1)
  
where Peerijt is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i uses peer j in determining executive 
compensation in year t, as disclosed in its proxy statement filed with the SEC, zero otherwise; 
Firm characteristic is a set of variables that captures similarities between firms and their 
potential peers, and Peer pay is a measure of CEO compensation for the peer firm.  
The treatment sample for this test includes peers chosen by firms as disclosed in their 
proxy filing. These peers represent cases in which Peer = 1. To estimate the model, we require a 
sample of peers not chosen by management. Following FY and BLN, the sample of potential 
peers includes all disclosing firms and their selected peers in a given year. For example, in 2006 
there are 1,067 disclosing firms in our sample and 2,922 different selected peers. Thus, for each 
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firm the pool of potential peers consists of the remaining 1,066 disclosing firms and the 2,922 
selected peers.2  
We estimate two specifications of Eq. (1) to follow FY and BLN, respectively. Table 2, 
Panel A presents a probit estimation of the FY specification. The model follows FY closely.  The 
first column presents the results using only the firm characteristics. Firms are more likely to 
choose peers from the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry and that 
have a similar size. This is consistent with the findings in Albuquerque (2009), who shows that 
industry-size peer groups capture similarity in firms’ economic shocks. In addition, peers are 
also matched on index membership (i.e., Dow Jones, S&P 500, or S&P Mid Cap 400), CEO 
responsibility (i.e., whether or not the CEO is also the chair of the board), number of peers, and 
talent flows (i.e., firms from which one of the top five executives moved during 1992–2005). 
Despite the larger sample, these results compare well with FY (Model 1 of their Table 4). In the 
second column of Table 2, as in FY, we include the log of total compensation for the peer’s 
CEO. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significantly different from zero, consistent 
with firms choosing peers with higher CEO pay. One interpretation for this finding mentioned in 
FY is that, after controlling for economic similarities between the two firms, firms appear to 
select highly paid peers to justify higher CEO pay.  
Panel B presents the results for the replication of the BLN specification. Consistent with 
BLN, firms are more likely to choose peers from the same Fama-French industry, as well as 
                                                 
2 Our analyses closely replicate the methodologies in both FY and BLN. While the FY and BLN methods are 
similar in several ways, there are some important differences. FY require the pool of potential peers to be in the S&P 
500 or the S&P Mid Cap 400, whereas BLN do not impose such a restriction. In addition, FY exclude the actual 
peers from the pool of potential peers, but BLN make no such exclusion. BLN allow separate coefficients for 
positive and negative differences between variables (e.g., positive vs. negative difference in sales) and include firm 
fixed-effects in the model, whereas FY do not include firm fixed-effects. As we follow each paper closely, our paper 
implements these differences. In untabulated analysis, we perform a series of tests (e.g., using each methodology 
consistently for both approaches) and find that these differences have little (if any) effect on our inferences. Further, 
because our sample spans more years and is larger than the samples in FY and BLN, we have estimated our FY and 
BLN models using a time period similar to that of each respective paper. Our results and inferences are unchanged. 
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peers with similar sales, profitability, growth opportunities, executive flows, S&P 500 
membership, credit rating, and complexity (as captured by the number of business and 
geographic segments). The results in Model 1 of Panel B are comparable with those of BLN 
(Model 1 of their Table 3). In Model 2, like BLN, we add the difference in total compensation 
between the peer’s CEO and the firm’s CEO, and allow for asymmetry in how relative pay 
affects the choice of peers. We find that firms are more likely to choose potential peers with 
higher paid, as opposed to lower paid, CEOs.  
In summary, Table 2 provides evidence that corroborates the results of FY and BLN. In 
addition, these tests provide evidence of the peer pay effect: that peers are more likely to be 
chosen if they have higher levels of CEO pay. We now turn to the main purpose of our paper: to 
explain the peer pay effect. 
3.2. Decomposition of the peer pay effect: talent versus self-serving behavior 
This section discusses how we decompose the peer pay effect into subcomponents 
capturing talent and self-serving behavior. We define the peer pay effect variable (PPE) as the 
percentage difference between the actual and the propensity-score-matched peer pay. Actual peer 
pay is the median total CEO compensation of the firm’s chosen peers. Propensity-score-matched 
peer pay is the median total CEO compensation of the firm’s propensity-matched peers. To 
generate the FY (BLN) propensity-score-matched peer pay, we do the following. We match each 
firm-peer-year observation in Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2 to a firm that has the closest fitted 
probability of being selected as a given peer using the fitted coefficients of Model 1 in Panel A 
(Panel B). We then compute the median actual pay for the selected peers and compare it to the 
median actual pay for the propensity-matched peers. For instance, if a firm selects 15 peers in a 
given year, we compare the median pay of the selected peers to the median pay of the 15 
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matched firms. We add the suffix FY or BLN to the PPE variable to indicate the version of PPE 
being used in our tests.  
Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for these measures. The mean value for 
PPE calculated using the FY (BLN) specification is 0.133 (0.037), which corresponds to firm-
chosen peers paying their CEOs approximately 13.3% (3.7%) higher than the CEO pay at 
predicted peers. Although our sample includes two additional years of observations after the 
2006 disclosure regulation takes effect, our values are similar to those reported by FY (10.7% in 
Table 5, p. 267). In untabulated analysis, we find that the median PPE among S&P 500 (non-
S&P 500) firms in our sample equals 7.6% (0.6%), which is very similar to BLN’s 8.0% (0.7%) 
for S&P 500 (non-S&P 500) firms in their Table 6, p. 549.3 In dollar terms, the 13.3% (3.7%) 
pay difference corresponds to CEO pay that is $896,000 ($463,000) higher at firm-chosen peers 
than it is at predicted peers for the FY (BLN) model.  The values are also consistent with the 
results in Table 2 that indicate that higher CEO pay increases the probability of being selected as 
a peer.  
We then test whether CEO talent represents an alternative explanation for the peer pay 
effect not considered by FY and BLN. Eq. (1) models the peer choice as a function of firm 
characteristics; it implicitly assumes that all proxies for similarities between the CEO and his 
peers are included in the model. FY and BLN attribute the peer pay effect to self-serving 
behavior. There are, however, potentially unobserved CEO talent characteristics, which 
represents a potential alternative explanation for the peer pay effect.  To test this idea, we 
                                                 
3 The peer pay effect using the BLN model is smaller than the one obtained using the FY model, likely because of 
two differences in the empirical design. First, BLN include firm fixed-effects in their probit model. Second, BLN 
allow for asymmetric deviations between the firm and chosen peers. For example, in the BLN model, the probability 
of picking a larger peer can be different from the probability of picking a smaller peer. When we estimate Eq. (1) 
using the BLN model but do not allow asymmetric peer selection and exclude the firm fixed-effects, we obtain a 
mean PPE of 18%. 
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estimate three variations of the following model: 
PPEit = β0 + ∑βm CEO talentm,it + ∑βn Self servingn,it + εit, (2)
  
where CEO talent is a set of proxies for CEO talent and Self serving is a set of governance 
measures as proxies for self-serving behavior.  
Because these constructs are inherently difficult to measure, we employ three approaches 
to decompose the peer pay effect into talent and self-serving components. First, we include only 
the proxies for CEO talent in the model and use the predicted component of the peer pay effect 
as a proxy for talent (PPE-Talent1). In this case, the residual from this model, i.e., the remaining 
portion of the peer pay effect that is not explained by our talent proxies, serves as a proxy for 
self-serving behavior (PPE-Self serving1). Second, we reverse this approach. Specifically, the 
model includes only the Self serving proxies and it uses the predicted component of the peer pay 
effect as a proxy for self-serving behavior. Thus, in our second approach, the residual from the 
model serves as a proxy for talent.  We label these variables as PPE-Talent2 and PPE-Self 
serving2.  
A drawback of these first two approaches is that the residual will also capture noise as 
well as any other potential explanations for the peer pay effect (e.g., any omitted variable 
associated with the peer pay effect). Thus, the third approach estimates Eq. (2) with the full set of 
proxies for CEO talent and Self serving. The third measure of CEO talent is the predicted 
component of PPE calculated using the estimated coefficients on the CEO talent variables. 
Similarly, the third measure of self-serving behavior is the predicted component of PPE 
calculated using the estimated coefficients on the Self serving variables. We label these variables 
as PPE-Talent3 and PPE-Self serving3. 
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 We use three measures to capture CEO talent: past abnormal performance, the size of the 
firms the CEO has managed in the past, and media coverage. The first construct, abnormal 
performance, is based on the idea that CEOs who have historically produced greater abnormal 
performance are more talented (see Carter et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2010; Fee and Hadlock, 
2003; and Rajgopal et al., 2006). We measure performance using both accounting and stock 
returns. CEO abn ROA is the average of the firm’s return on assets (ROA) measured relative to 
the industry ROA over years t-3 to t-1.4 Similarly, CEO abn ret is the average of the firm’s stock 
return measured relative to the S&P 500 index over years t-3 to t-1. The second measure, the size 
of the firms the CEO has managed, is based on the argument that the most talented CEOs are 
assigned to the largest firms in the economy (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Rosen, 1982). CEO log 
market cap is the natural logarithm of the average market capitalization of the companies for 
which the CEO worked over years t-3 to t-1. When calculating these three measures over the 
previous three-year period, CEOs need not have worked at the same firm nor have served as 
CEO. Finally, our third measure, the extent of media coverage, is based on the idea that the 
business press tends to cover CEOs who are recognized as talented, high achievers, or role 
models in their industries (see Falato et al., 2011; Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal et al., 2006). We 
measure Media coverage as the number of articles containing the CEO’s name and the firm’s 
name that appear in the major business newspapers. Following Falato et al. (2011), we only 
count the number of articles that do not have a negative tone.  
We use several proxies for Self serving behavior intended to capture weak corporate 
governance structures. As mentioned above, while the board’s compensation committee is 
                                                 
4 The use of the prior three years is admittedly ad hoc but not crucial to our findings. Our results are robust to the 
use of two to five years when measuring CEO talent. The important feature is that these measures are aggregated 
over a period longer than one year so as to distinguish the effect from firm characteristics already included in the 
probit selection model.  
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responsible for setting executive pay, executives can affect this process. Hence, the proxies used 
represent situations in which the CEO could more strongly influence the pay-setting process, 
relative to the board’s ability to control it. We follow the literature in our choice of measures of 
weak governance or self-serving behavior (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007; Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008). Our measures reflect three dimensions of 
governance: (i) board structure, (ii) antitakeover provisions, and (iii) ownership concentration.   
We proxy for board structure using variables aimed at capturing whether the board is 
busy, the percentage of the board hired after the CEO, and board size. Core et al. (1999) argue 
that directors who serve on too many boards are less effective at attending to their monitoring 
duties. Busy board is an indicator variable that equals one if the number of other boards on which 
the firm directors serve is above the sample median, zero otherwise. Board hired after CEO 
proxies for the extent to which the CEO is able to exert influence over board members to extract 
private benefits (Core et al., 1999; BLN, 2011). This indicator variable equals one if the 
percentage of the board hired after the CEO is higher than the sample median, zero otherwise. 
Board size captures the board’s effectiveness in monitoring and evaluating the CEO. Recent 
studies find evidence that larger boards can provide optimal monitoring when a manager’s 
opportunity to consume private benefits is high (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 2008; Boone et al., 
2007). Small board size is an indicator variable that equals one if board size is below the sample 
median, zero otherwise.  
We proxy for antitakeover provisions using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
measure of the strength of shareholder rights (GIM index). High GIM index is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the value of GIM index is above the sample median (as in BLN), zero 
otherwise.  In an untabulated test, we also use the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index as 
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an alternative measure of antitakeover provisions. The inferences are almost identical, which is 
not surprising given that Bebchuk et al.’s measure is calculated based on six antitakeover 
provisions from the Gompers et al. index.  
We proxy for ownership concentration using the percentage of the firm’s shares held by 
institutional investors and by the firm’s insiders. Having a larger percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors is consistent with more oversight on the part of potentially active large 
shareholders (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Small institutional ownership is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors is 
below the sample median, zero otherwise. Regarding insider ownership, prior research (e.g., 
Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2002) argues that, among firms 
with low levels of insider ownership, increased insider ownership is associated with higher 
incentives for top managers to increase firm value (“incentive effect”), but that, for high levels of 
insider ownership, the entrenchment incentives exceed the incentive leading to potential 
opportunistic behavior by insiders. Because our sample consists of firms in the S&P 1500, for 
which insider ownership is arguably low, we define Small insider ownership as an indicator 
variable that equals one if the percentage of shares in the hands of the top five executives, as 
defined by ExecuComp, is below the sample median, zero otherwise.5 Finally, we include a 
variable indicating whether the number of peers is small (Small peer group). FY suggest that it is 
easier to justify a higher compensation when the peer group is smaller because fewer highly paid 
peers are required. 
We expect our proxies for weaker corporate governance to be positively related to the 
peer pay effect if CEOs are more able to influence the choice of highly paid peers when 
                                                 
5 Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that the entrenchment effect occurs for high 
levels of insider ownership (e.g., above 37.5% in their sample). The mean (median) level of insider ownership for 
our sample firms is 3% (2%), with only five firms passing the 37.5% threshold. 
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corporate governance is weak. However, we acknowledge that while our proxies for governance 
follow prior literature, these measures often have an alternative interpretation. For example, 
recent studies have associated smaller boards with the board’s less effective monitoring of the 
CEO’s actions (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 2008; and Boone et al., 2007), but some other studies 
(Yermack, 1996; Core et al., 1999) find evidence consistent with smaller boards being associated 
with stronger governance structures. Thus, our results are a joint test of the effect of self-serving 
behavior on the peer pay effect and on our measures identifying self-serving. Further, 
governance variables are endogenous and affected by both observable and unobservable firm 
characteristics. Section 3.4 discusses these issues in more detail and provides sensitivity analyses 
to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by our set of proxies for self-serving behavior.  
Panel B of Table 3 provides Pearson (Spearman) correlations among the Eq. (2) variables 
below (above) the main diagonal. Based on the Pearson correlations, PPE_FY is positively 
correlated with the CEO’s past stock performance (0.07), past firm size (0.16), and visibility in 
the news (0.13), providing evidence that the peer pay effect is related to the CEO’s perceived 
talent. In addition, the talent proxies are positively correlated among themselves. For example, 
the correlation between abnormal stock return and CEO log market cap equals 0.24, whereas the 
correlation between CEO log market cap and Log media coverage equals 0.61. 
In analyzing the correlations between PPE and the self-serving proxies, we find that the 
peer pay effect is only positively correlated with the board structure characteristics. For example, 
PPE_BLN is positively correlated with busy boards (0.06) and with the fraction of the board 
hired after the CEO (0.06). In addition, the self-serving variables are not always positively 
correlated amongst themselves. For example, Small board size is negatively correlated with 
Small institutional ownership (-0.31) and High GIM index (-0.15).   
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Panel C shows the results of regressing the peer pay effect on our proxies for talent and 
self-serving behavior (i.e., estimating Eq. (2)). The first (last) three columns use PPE_FY 
(PPE_BLN) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 4 show the results of regressing PPE on 
the talent proxies only, i.e., our first method for decomposing PPE.  Coefficients on both CEO 
abn ret and CEO log market cap are positive and statistically significant in both the FY and BLN 
models. This implies that firms with high PPE are those which have CEOs who exhibit a larger 
past abnormal stock performance, and who have managed larger and more complex 
organizations. The coefficient on Log media coverage is not significant in either model. The 
CEO abn ROA coefficient is negative and statistically significant using the BLN model in 
column 4. This unexpected negative result is due to the inclusion of CEO abn ret and CEO log 
market cap in the model. Untabulated analyses show that if we remove these variables, the 
coefficient on CEO abn ROA becomes positive albeit statistically insignificant. Overall, the 
results in columns 1 and 4 indicate that the peer pay effect is partially explained by the proxies 
for CEO talent. 
The results of estimating Eq. (2) using only the self-serving proxies (our second method 
of decomposing PPE) are presented in columns 2 and 5. We find some evidence that corporate 
governance characteristics explain the peer pay effect. PPE is larger for firms with busy boards, 
using both the FY and BLN models, and when board members were hired after the CEO took 
office, using the BLN model. We find little evidence that the other governance variables explain 
the peer pay effect. 
Columns 3 and 6 present the results of estimating Eq. (2) using both the talent and self-
serving proxies.  In terms of talent proxies, as above, the results show that PPE is higher for 
CEOs who exhibit a higher historical abnormal stock performance, have managed larger and 
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more complex organizations, but with a lower accounting performance. The results also show 
that PPE_FY is larger for more visible CEOs, as captured by their media coverage. In terms of 
the self-serving proxies, Busy board and Board hired after CEO are significant and positively 
associated with PPE in the FY and BLN specifications, respectively. Firms with smaller boards 
have a higher PPE in both specifications. On the other hand, to the extent that firms with larger 
insider and institutional ownership are associated with stronger monitoring on the part of insiders 
and institutional investors, the negative coefficients on Small insider ownership and Small 
institutional ownership are inconsistent with PPE capturing self-serving behavior.  
Overall, the results in Table 3, Panel C indicate that the peer pay effect is partially 
explained by proxies for CEO talent and self-serving behavior. We then use this result to 
decompose the peer pay effect into the talent and self-serving components. In the next sections, 
we validate these constructs by correlating them with future accounting and stock performance 
and then study their impact on CEO compensation. 
3.2.1. Validating the peer pay effect decomposition 
Because CEO talent and self-serving behavior are constructs that are inherently difficult 
to measure, following Core et al. (1999), we relate the components of the peer pay effect 
capturing talent and self-serving behavior to future accounting and stock performance to validate 
their respective use as proxies for these constructs. If the talent component captures CEO talent, 
then it should be associated with a stronger future performance. In contrast, if the self-serving 
component captures self-serving behavior, then it should be negatively associated with future 
performance. We measure performance by future accounting and stock returns. As discussed in 
Core et al. (1999), this prediction is stronger for accounting performance but less clear for stock 
return performance. This is because, under efficient markets, stock returns would fully price the 
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future cash flow implications of talent and self-serving behavior and peer choice practices would 
not translate into differences in stock returns. To test our assertions, we estimate the following 
models: 
Future ROAit = β0 + β1 Cdf PPE-Talentit + β2 Cdf PPE-Self servingit  
+ β3 Salesit + β4 Log STD ROAit  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + εit. (3)
                                                                             
Future Retit = β0 + β1 Cdf PPE-Talentit + β2 Cdf PPE-Self servingit  
+ β3 Log market valueit + β4 Log STD retit + β5 Book-market ratioit  
+ Industry effects + Year effects + εit. (4)
                                                                             
Future ROA is the one-year-ahead annual return on assets. Future ret is the 12-month stock 
returns for the one-year-ahead fiscal year. Our set of control variables follows Core et al. (1999). 
STD ROA (STD ret) is the standard deviation of return on assets (stock returns) over the prior 
four years. Sales is the total sales revenues. Market value is the market capitalization of the firm. 
The prefix Log indicates that we took the natural logarithm of the variable. Other variables are 
defined above.  
We estimate Eqs. (3) and (4) separately for each of the three methods of decomposing the 
peer pay effect, and separately using the FY and BLN versions of the peer pay effect. Following 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Rajgopal et al. (2006), among others, to facilitate 
comparisons of the economic significance across PPE-Talent and PPE-Self serving, we 
transform these three variables by using their empirical cumulative distribution functions 
(indicated by the prefix Cdf). These variables then have the same standard deviation, and a mean 
and median of approximately 0.5. 
Table 4, Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in these regressions. 
The mean value for PPE-Talent3_FY (PPE-Talent3_BLN) equals 0.41 (0.53), whereas the mean 
value for PPE-Self serving3_FY (PPE-Self serving3_BLN) equals 0.008 (0.016). This provides 
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preliminary evidence that the expected peer pay effect driven by talent is higher than the 
respective value for the self-serving component.   
Table 4, Panel B presents the results of our estimation of Eq. (3), which uses future 
accounting performance as the dependent variable. The first (last) four columns present the result 
for the FY (BLN) specification. Column 1 shows the results when we employ the cumulative 
distribution function of PPE that uses the FY model before decomposing it. The results show 
that the PPE measure is not (statistically) negatively associated with future accounting 
performance, as one would expect if PPE were only capturing self-serving behavior. However, a 
different picture emerges once we decompose the PPE measures into their talent and self-serving 
components, as shown in columns 2 through 4. Specifically, the coefficients on the talent and 
self-serving components are now generally positive and negative, respectively. The only 
exception is when the residual PPE serves as a proxy for CEO talent (Cdf PPE-Talent2 in model 
3). In terms of economic significance, using the column 4 results, an increase in the Cdf PPE-
Talent3 from the first to the third quartile of the distribution leads to an increase in performance 
of 0.46% (i.e., 0.5 multiplied by the 0.91 coefficient on Cdf PPE-Talent3 in column 4). In 
contrast, a similar increase in Cdf PPE-Self serving3 leads to a decrease in performance of 
0.39%.  Columns 5 through 8 show a set of tests similar to columns 1 through 4 but with the 
BLN version of the peer pay effect. The inferences are generally similar. That is, future 
accounting performance is generally positively related to the talent portions of the peer pay effect 
whereas the relation with the self-serving component is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. 
In terms of control variables, accounting performance is generally positively related to sales and 
negatively related to the standard deviation of ROA.  
Table 4, Panel C presents the results of regressions that predict future stock performance. 
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The coefficient on PPE is either insignificant (column 1) or positive and significantly different 
than zero (column 5), which is inconsistent with it simply capturing self-serving behavior. 
Further, across columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, the coefficients on the talent component of PPE (Cdf 
PPE-Talent) are always positive and statistically significant in five out of the six cases. The 
coefficient on PPE-Self serving, in contrast, is always insignificant. In terms of economic 
significance, using the results from column 8, an increase in the talent component of the peer pay 
effect from the first to the third quartile of the distribution leads to an increase in stock 
performance by 54% whereas a similar increase in the self-serving component leads to a 
decrease in stock performance of 7%. 
In sum, the results in Table 4 show that the proxies for talent are generally positively 
related to abnormal accounting and stock performance, whereas the proxies for self-serving 
behavior are either unrelated or negatively related to abnormal performance. These results hence 
increase confidence in our assertion that the measures of PPE-Talent proxy for CEO talent while 
the PPE-Self serving measures proxy for self-serving behavior.  
3.3. The ability of peer pay components to explain CEO compensation  
If the choice of peers is a vital component of the compensation-setting process, then 
peers’ CEO pay should be positively related to firms’ CEO pay. As a starting point of this 
analysis, we first corroborate the results of FY and BLN that the total compensation of peer 
CEOs is economically important after controlling for the determinants of compensation as 
established by the extant literature. We estimate: 
Log future payit = α + γ1 Log peer payit + Σ βm Controlsm,it +  εit. (5)
                                                                             
Future pay is equal to the total compensation for firm i’s CEO in year t+1. Peer pay is the 
median total compensation of the firm’s selected peers. Controls include firm size, firm 
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performance measures (change in ROA, stock return, and lagged stock return), lagged market-to-
book value of assets, and lagged firm volatility (measured by the natural logarithm of the 
standard deviation of stock returns calculated over the last four years), all of which have been 
shown to explain compensation levels (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and Guay, 1999; 
Murphy, 1999). We also include year and industry (two-digit SIC codes) fixed-effects to control 
for any variation in CEO pay over time and across industries and we cluster the standard errors at 
the firm-level.  
We then expand Eq. (5) in two ways. First, we substitute the compensation of the firm’s 
selected peers, Peer pay, for its components: the compensation of the propensity-score-matched 
peers, Peer pay matched, and the peer pay effect (PPE), that is, the pay at selected peers in 
excess of the pay at the matched peers. To facilitate interpretation and comparison across 
coefficients, we standardize the matched and residual peer pay using their CDF function. We 
estimate the following model: 
Log payit+1 = α + γ1 Cdf PPEit + γ2 Cdf Peer pay matchedit  
+ Σ βm Controlsm,it +  εit+1. (6)
                                                                             
Second, we use our decomposition of the peer pay effect into the talent and self-serving 
components to test their association with CEO pay. As before, we also standardize the talent and 
self-serving components of the peer pay effect using their CDF function. Thus, we estimate the 
following regression: 
Log payit+1 = α + γ1 Cdf PPE-Talentit + γ2 Cdf PPE-Self servingit  
+ γ3 Cdf Peer pay matchedit + Σ βm Controlsm,it +  εit+1. (7)
                                                                             
Table 5 shows the results. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the CEO 
compensation and its control variables used in estimating Eqs. (5) to (7). The median total 
compensation in our sample equals $4.59 million. This amount is slightly higher than the $3.88 
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million median compensation reported by BLN, but much smaller than the median pay of $6.09 
million in FY. This difference, relative to FY, is likely due to the fact that our S&P 1500 sample 
includes a larger set of firms (it includes not only S&P 900 Large Cap and Mid Cap firms, but 
also S&P 600 Small Cap firms).  
Table 5, Panel B presents the regression results. The estimated coefficients on the control 
variables are generally consistent with the literature. For example, CEOs at larger firms with 
better performance and more growth opportunities receive higher pay. In column 1, the 
coefficient on Log peer pay is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the 
median CEO pay of the firm-chosen peers is an incrementally important explanatory variable 
over and above the established economic factors shown to predict CEO compensation, as in FY 
and BLN. A one-standard-deviation increase in the median pay of the firm-chosen peers is 
associated with an increase in the disclosing firm’s CEO pay of approximately $1,471,400.6 
Column 2 shows the results of Eq. (6) using the FY version of the peer pay effect. The 
coefficient on Cdf_PPE is positive and statistically significant, consistent with the peer pay 
effect increasing CEO compensation. As expected, the compensation of the propensity-score-
matched peers, Peer pay matched, is also positively related to CEO compensation. The results of 
columns 1 and 2 corroborate the results in FY, who show that the compensation of selected peers 
is positively associated with CEO pay.  
In columns 3 through 5, we replace the peer pay effect with its talent and self-serving 
components. In all cases, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, consistent with 
both a talent and self-serving peer pay effect on compensation. However, the coefficient on the 
talent component of pay is two to almost ten times larger than the coefficient on the self-serving 
                                                 
6 The dollar value of $1,471,400 is obtained as [exp(8.527+0.38*0.673)-exp(8.527)], in which 8.527 is the mean 
of the natural logarithm of selected peers’ total pay; 0.38 is the coefficient on the variable Peer pay in Table 5, Panel 
B, column 1; and 0.673 is the standard deviation of Log peer pay (from Panel A of Table 5).   
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component of the PPE. For example, even when the talent component is computed as the 
residual from the regression of the peer pay effect on self-serving proxies (arguably our most 
conservative estimation method of talent) the coefficient on Cdf PPE-Talent2 is almost twice the 
magnitude of the coefficient on Cdf PPE-Self serving2 (0.60 versus 0.33 in column 4). When we 
model both talent and self-serving—our third method presented in column 5—the coefficient on 
talent is almost ten times larger than the coefficient on self-serving. In economic terms, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the talent portion of the PPE in column 5 increases the mean 
compensation by 26.7%, which is about $1,811,000. In contrast, a similar increase in the self-
serving component of the PPE in column 5 increases the mean compensation by 2.7%, which is 
about $184,000.7 Columns 6 to 9 provide the same tests as in columns 2 to 5, but using the BLN 
version of the peer pay effect instead of the FY version. The sign and magnitude of coefficients 
and t-statistics are highly similar to their corresponding coefficients in the previous four 
columns.  
To summarize, Table 5 provides evidence that CEO talent is an economically important 
explanation for why firms select highly paid peers. The self-serving measures are also positively 
associated with CEO compensation, but at lower magnitudes than those of talent.  In terms of 
economic significance, the impact of the self-serving component of the peer pay effect on CEO 
pay ranges from about one-tenth to less than two-thirds of the impact of the talent component.  
3.4. Robustness tests 
The key aspect of our research design is our decomposition of the peer pay effect into the 
talent and self-serving components. As discussed above, these constructs are difficult to measure 
                                                 
7 The dollar values of $1,811,000 and $184,000 are obtained as [exp(8.406+1.18*0.288)-exp(8.406)] and 
[exp(8.406+0.14*0.288)-exp(8.406)], respectively. As described in Table 5, Panel A, 8.406 is the mean of the log 
compensation and 0.288 is the standard deviation of the CDFs of the predicted and residual peer pay effects 
(untabulated). 
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and can only be proxied by the researcher. In our main analyses, we use three methods to 
implement this decomposition and validate these proxies by examining the effect of the talent 
and self-serving components on future firm performance. In this section, we perform three sets of 
additional robustness analyses. Our tests are classified in three groups: (i) sensitivity to 
alternative measures of CEO talent, (ii) sensitivity to alternative measures of self-serving 
behavior, and (iii) decomposition of the peer pay effect over time.  
3.4.1. Proxies for talent 
 With respect to proxies for talent, we consider two alternative measures of talent used by 
prior research. The first considers historical CEO pay as a proxy for talent. This measure has 
been used in prior studies as a measure of talent; more talented CEOs are expected to receive 
higher total compensation under an efficient market (e.g., Chang et al., 2010). We measure Past 
CEO pay as the logarithm of cumulative total compensation over the prior three years, so Past 
CEO pay in 2006 reflects the sum of total pay for the years 2003 to 2005. Our main analysis does 
not include this measure because one could argue that historical CEO pay could be a reflection of 
prior self-serving behavior instead of talent. Thus, we present these results as a robustness test 
and measure historical pay over the prior three years to mitigate the concern that it could capture 
self-serving behavior. We then include this measure as an additional proxy for talent in the 
decomposition of the peer pay effect. 
 Our second proxy for CEO talent is CEO fixed-effects. Since Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003), several papers have used manager fixed-effects as a way to isolate unobserved 
characteristics of the CEO. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) separate manager fixed-effects from firm 
fixed-effects by analyzing a large panel of compensation data composed of managers who have 
switched firms. Their method, however, restricts the sample because a relatively small number of 
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executives change jobs on ExecuComp. More recently, Graham et al. (2012) estimate CEO 
fixed-effects as a proxy for CEO talent by means of a procedure developed by Abowd, Kramarz, 
and Margolis (1999) (AKM) that overcomes this data limitation. Specifically, the AKM 
procedure allows for the estimation of CEO fixed-effects in a much larger sample because it 
permits the estimation of CEO fixed-effects, in addition to firm fixed-effects, for CEOs who did 
not necessarily change firms over the estimation period as long as they worked for firms that 
replaced executives during this period. The detailed estimation is provided in Graham et al. 
(2012, Appendix B).  
We follow Graham et al. (2012) closely in the implementation of the AKM method and 
estimate an out-of-sample measure of CEO fixed-effects using the population of ExecuComp 
firms from 1993 to 2005. We stop in 2005 so that the fixed-effects estimation precedes our 
sample period. This methodology permits us to obtain CEO fixed-effects for 597 CEOs 
representing 1,362 firm-years in our sample. Because the sample is substantially smaller than our 
main sample, we present these results as additional tests. We then include the CEO fixed-effects 
as another measure of talent in the decomposition of the peer pay effect. Further, this method 
allows us to estimate an out-of-sample firm fixed-effect, which we include as an additional 
control. Note, however, that we do not include the firm fixed-effect in the estimate of the talent 
component of the peer pay effect, as this measure captures unobservable firm characteristics 
unrelated to CEO talent.  
These results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 6. Panel A reports the 
decomposition of the peer pay effect (analogous to Table 3), whereas Panel B presents the 
compensation regressions (analogous to Table 5). In untabulated analysis, our inferences are 
unchanged when we estimate the performance regressions reported in Table 4 after including 
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historical CEO pay and CEO fixed-effects as proxies for talent. For parsimony, we also report 
only our third method for decomposing the peer pay effect. This method models the peer pay 
effect as a function of proxies for both talent and self-serving behavior, and then uses the 
respective coefficients to estimate PPE-Talent3 and PPE-Self serving3.  
In Table 6 Panel A, we find that both Past CEO pay and CEO fixed effect are positively 
and statistically associated with the peer pay effect. This is consistent with our main hypothesis 
that the peer pay effect captures CEO talent. In terms of the compensation regressions (Panel B), 
our general inferences remain. Specifically, when using Past CEO pay (CEO fixed effect) as an 
additional proxy for talent, we find that the talent component of the peer pay effect (Cdf PPE-
Talent3) is positively associated with CEO compensation. Further, in these regressions the self-
serving component (Cdf PPE-Self serving3) is no longer statistically significant, which suggests 
that our prior inferences about the self-serving effect are even smaller if one considers prior pay 
or fixed-effects as a proxy for CEO talent.8  
Overall, the findings in this section strengthen our hypothesis and results that CEO talent 
is a major explanation for the peer pay effect shown in FY and BLN.  
3.4.2. Proxies for self-serving behavior 
 With respect to proxies for self-serving behavior, we perform two sensitivity analyses. 
First, our main analysis excludes some measures of governance used in FY and BLN that could 
also capture CEO talent, such as whether the CEO is also the chair of the board, the tenure of the 
CEO in the firm, and whether the CEO works for an S&P 500 firm. In this section, we include 
these measures to ensure that our results are not driven by the exclusion of these variables. Table 
                                                 
8 Our measures of the talent and self-serving components of PPE computed in Table 3 have a positive and 
negative Pearson correlation of about 0.30 and -0.15, respectively, with the CEO fixed-effects measure. To the 
extent that CEO fixed-effects capture CEO talent, as argued in Graham et al. (2012), this provides an alternative way 
to validate our peer pay effect decomposition.  
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6 presents these results (see columns with ‘FY/BLN variables’). In Panel A, we find that the peer 
pay effect is smaller when the CEO is also the board chair and for S&P 500 firms. Moreover, in 
Panel B, the results continue to support our inference that the peer pay effect mostly represents 
compensation for CEO talent. 
 Second, we include additional control variables in our decomposition of the peer pay 
effect to deal with the endogenous nature of some of the governance proxies (e.g., board 
structure). For instance, prior research finds that board structure is explained by firm 
characteristics such as firm size, the number of business segments, leverage, R&D intensity, 
intangible assets, risk, performance, and growth opportunities (e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008). Some of these firm characteristics 
are already included in the probit model that predicts the selected and propensity-matched peers. 
Thus, to the extent that these firm characteristics have already been matched in the first stage, 
they are unlikely to explain the cross-sectional variation in the peer pay effect in our 
decomposition. Nonetheless, we include the following firm characteristics as additional 
explanatory variables in the model used to decompose the peer pay effect: the firm’s return 
volatility, leverage, R&D scaled by total assets, market-to-book value of assets, and the number 
of business segments in which it operates. We find little evidence, however, that these variables 
explain the peer pay effect (untabulated). More importantly, as shown in Table 6, our peer pay 
effect decomposition and the compensation results are unaffected by the inclusion of these 
controls. In untabulated analysis, we obtain similar results using other alternative proxies for 
corporate governance: board independence and a Herfindahl measure of institutional ownership 
concentration.  
Overall, these results provide evidence that our inferences are robust to alternative 
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proxies for self-serving behavior as well as to controlling for firm characteristics associated with 
endogenous measures of corporate governance.  
3.4.3. The impact of the peer pay effect on CEO compensation over time 
Our last robustness analysis investigates the evolution of the peer pay effect and its 
components over time. A recent study by Faulkender and Yang (2012) investigates a similar 
issue and argues that peer manipulation for benchmarking purposes has become more severe 
over time. We thus repeat our analysis separately for each of the three years of our sample to 
ensure that our results are not driven by the earlier years in our sample. Specifically, we 
decompose the peer pay effect following regression models 3 and 6 in Table 3, Panel C but 
estimate three separate annual regressions for 2006, 2007, and 2008. We then repeat the 
compensation tests (regression models 5 and 9 in Table 5, Panel B) for each of these years. 
Table 7 provides evidence on the impact of the talent and self-serving components on 
CEO compensation over time. Panel A shows the results using the FY model, while Panel B 
shows the results with the BLN model. For parsimony, all control variables from the Table 5 
analysis are included in the regression but not tabulated (the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables remain very similar to the ones in Table 5). Columns 1 through 3 show that the impact 
of PPE increased from 2006 to 2008. This is consistent with the findings in Faulkender and 
Yang (2012). However, once we decompose the peer pay effect into the talent and self-serving 
components in columns 4 to 6, we find no evidence that the effect of the self-serving components 
of PPE increased over time using the FY model in Panel A, and weak evidence that this self-
serving effect increased over time with the BLN specification in Panel B. More importantly, our 
inferences regarding talent remain significant throughout the period, and are also stronger in 
recent years using the BLN model.  
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4. Conclusion 
We study how the choice of benchmarking peers impacts CEO compensation. Recent 
papers by FY (2010) and BLN (2011) show that firms are more likely to choose peers that pay 
their CEOs higher compensation, consistent with firms self-servingly selecting peers to justify 
increasing CEO pay. Our paper hypothesizes that the peer pay effect could also represent a 
reward for CEO talent, which captures managerial success in managing complex organizations 
and achieving high performance. In other words, we contribute to this literature by studying the 
relative extent to which the peer pay effect reflects self-serving behavior or a reward for CEO 
talent. 
We show that the peer pay effect largely captures the need to pay CEOs more for their 
talent. While there is some evidence that self-serving behavior is also an explanation for the peer 
pay effect, it seems to represent a less economically important explanation for the peer pay effect 
than does CEO talent. Thus, our results support Holmstrom and Kaplan’s (2003) argument and 
Bizjak et al.’s (2008) findings that the effect of peer benchmarking on CEO pay is more 
consistent with tighter labor markets than with managerial entrenchment or weak corporate 
governance. Our findings provide an efficient contracting perspective to prior results on peer 
selection and benchmarking. In addition, they add to a recent line of research that studies the role 
of CEO talent in several features of executive compensation contracts. 
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Appendix. Quotes from proxy statements describing how peers are selected 
 
 
Quote #1 
“The decision to consider data for companies beyond those in the peer group in Invacare’s performance 
graph in setting executive compensation levels reflects Invacare’s view that a broad range of companies 
of comparable size compete with Invacare for senior executive talent. The Company believes that the use 
of this survey data helps ensure that it is positioned to attract and retain qualified senior executives in the 
face of competitive pressures.” (Source: Invacare Corp 2008 DEF 14A) 
 
Quote #2 
“We offer total compensation packages at levels we consider to be competitive with a peer group of 
companies of similar size in the restaurant industry. In determining our executive officer compensation, 
we may consider generally available source material on companies in the restaurant industry from 
business periodicals, proxy statements, and other resources. From time to time, we may consider publicly 
available compensation data from national companies that we believe are generally comparable to us in 
terms of size, organization structure, and growth characteristics, and against which we believe we 
compete for executive talent.” (Source: Panera Bread Co. 2008 DEF 14A) 
 
Quote #3 
“We use a peer group of companies as a reference for determining competitive total compensation 
packages. […] These companies were selected because we share many distinguishing criteria, including, 
but not limited to, a common industry, similar distribution system challenges, market capitalization, 
global operations, significant brand equity, and/or certain financial criteria. We also compete with these 
companies for executive talent.” (Source: Coca-Cola Co. 2006 DEF 14A) 
 
Quote #4 
“The committee selected this peer group because the group consisted of companies that were competitors 
of Mellon for business and talent; these companies were considered to be the comparators by analysts 
covering Mellon, the aggregate mix of the peer group companies resembled Mellon’s overall business 
mix, and Mellon’s scope was closely aligned with the median of the peer group’s scope measures 
(namely, revenue, net income, market capitalization, total assets, and current assets under management).” 
(Source: Bank of New York Mellon Corp 2007 DEF 14A). 
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Table 1  
Sample selection 
This table presents our sample selection. Panel A shows the criteria we used. Panel B provides descriptive 
statistics for the number of peers disclosed per firm. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
   
 Observations 
  
Firm-year observations with available data for fiscal years of 2006, 2007, and 2008 4,217 
  
Firm-year observations reporting usage of compensation peers 3,772 
  
Firm-year observations explicitly disclosing peers 3,221
  
Firm-year observations with required data to estimate peer choice models (Table 2) 3,158 
  
Firm-year observations with required data to decompose the peer pay effect  (Table 3) 2,836 
  
Firm-year observations with required data to estimate compensation models  (Tables 4 to 7) 2,158 
  
 
         
Panel B: Number of peers per firm (3,158 firm-year observations) 
 
  Percentiles 
Mean Std. dev. 1st 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th 
17.8 10.3 2 6 12 16 21 36 59 
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Table 2 
Analysis of peer choice 
This table reports the results of estimating two models that predict the peer choice (Peer) for 3,158 firms 
disclosing peers. Panel A replicates the probit model used by FY to estimate peer choice (see Table 4 of FY for 
more details). Panel B replicates the logit model estimated with firm fixed-effects that BLN use to estimate peer 
choice (see Table 3 of BLN for more details). The reported coefficient is the elasticity, which represents the change 
in the probability of a peer being selected for a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable (or a unit 
change in the case of an indicator variable). The independent variables in Panel A are defined as follows. Log peer 
pay is the natural logarithm of the total pay of each firm’s peer (i.e., measured at the peer j level). Total pay is 
calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation, the grant-date fair value of option 
awards, the grant-date fair value of stock awards, and other compensation for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. For fiscal 
year 2005, total CEO compensation is calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plans, other annual 
compensation, the market value of restricted stock grants, the value of options awarded, and all other compensation. 
The value of options awarded for 2005 is calculated using the Black-Scholes value or, when the Black-Scholes value 
is not available, it is assumed to be the total grant-date present value of options awarded. Two-digit industry and 
Three-digit industry are indicator variables equal to one if a potential peer is in the same two-digit and three-digit 
standard industry classification (SIC) industry of the firm, zero otherwise, respectively. Sales within 50–200%, 
Assets within 50–200%, and Market cap within 50–200% are indicator variables equal to one if the sizes (Sales, 
Assets, and Market capitalization) of the firm and the potential peer are within 50–200% of each other, zero 
otherwise. Dow 30, S&P 500, and S&P Mid Cap 400 are indicator variables equal to one if both the firm and its 
potential peer are members of the Dow30, S&P 500, or S&P Mid Cap 400 indexes, respectively, zero otherwise. 
CEO is chair (CEO is not chair) is an indicator variable equal to one when CEOs of both the firm and its potential 
peer are (are not) chairmen of the board of directors, zero otherwise. Talent flows is an indicator variable equal to 
one if at least one of the top five executives moved between the firm and its potential peer during 1992–2005, zero 
otherwise. Number of peers is the number of compensation peers chosen by the firm. The independent variables in 
Panel B are defined as follows. Pos peer pay dif (Neg peer pay dif) is defined as the Log peer total pay – Log firm 
total pay when firm total pay < (>) peer total pay, zero otherwise. Fama-French industry is an indicator variable 
equal to one if both the firm and potential peer are in the same 48 Fama-French (1997) industry classification, zero 
otherwise. Industry correlation is the correlation of the firm’s industry return and the potential peer’s industry 
return. Pos sales dif (Neg sales dif) is defined as the Log peer sales – Log firm sales when firm sales < (>) peer 
sales, zero otherwise. Pos ROA dif (Neg ROA dif) is defined as the peer ROA – firm ROA when the firm ROA < (>) 
peer ROA, zero otherwise. ROA is net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Pos MTB dif (Neg 
MTB dif) is defined as the peer MTB – firm MTB when the firm MTB < (>) peer MTB, zero otherwise. MTB is the 
ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. Talent flows is defined as above. S&P 500 (Not S&P 
500) is an indicator variable equal to one if both the firm and peer are (are not) S&P 500 firms, zero otherwise. 
Credit rating is an indicator variable equal to one if both the firm and peer have the same credit rating, zero 
otherwise. Multiple business segments (Single business segments) is an indicator variable equal to one if both the 
firm and peer have multiple (only one) business segment(s), zero otherwise. Multiple geographical segments (Single 
geographical segments) is an indicator variable equal to one if both the firm and peer have multiple (only one) 
geographical segment(s), zero otherwise. Observations are at the firm-peer-year level. Reported z-statistics in 
parentheses are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-sided) 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel A: FY specification 
 
   
 (1) (2) 
   
Log peer pay  0.16*** 
  (86.69) 
Two-digit industry 1.05*** 1.06*** 
 (103.73) (97.35) 
Three-digit industry 0.56*** 0.57*** 
 (46.07) (51.81) 
Sales within 50–200% 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (38.55) (39.78) 
Assets within 50–200% 0.28*** 0.29*** 
 (101.50) (147.91) 
Market cap within 50–200% 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (34.27) (37.80) 
Dow 30 1.26*** 1.17*** 
 (44.24) (48.94) 
S&P 500 0.50*** 0.38*** 
 (49.61) (54.68) 
S&P Mid Cap 400 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (18.38) (23.42) 
CEO is chair 0.12*** 0.10*** 
 (9.49) (6.86) 
CEO is not chair -0.02* 0.00 
 (-1.66) (0.24) 
Talent flows 0.88*** 0.85*** 
 (111.38) (67.16) 
Number of peers 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (14.68) (14.88) 
   
   
Pseudo R2 (%) 27.2% 28.1% 
Observations 5,059,272 5,059,272 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: BLN specification 
 
   
 (1) (2) 
   
Pos peer pay dif  -0.08*** 
  (-8.29) 
Neg peer pay dif  0.21*** 
  (22.56) 
Fama-French industry 2.97*** 2.97*** 
 (166.92) (166.62) 
Industry correlation 0.76*** 0.77*** 
 (27.99) (28.28) 
Pos sales dif -0.71*** -0.71*** 
 (-80.58) (-76.73) 
Neg sales dif 1.72*** 1.68*** 
 (142.00) (135.68) 
Pos ROA dif -0.60*** -0.72*** 
 (-5.12) (-6.14) 
Neg ROA dif 1.30*** 1.19*** 
 (10.91) (10.00) 
Pos MTB dif -0.04*** -0.02*** 
 (-5.39) (-2.69) 
Neg MTB dif 0.47*** 0.47*** 
 (37.41) (37.16) 
Talent flows 1.38*** 1.36*** 
 (23.04) (22.84) 
S&P 500 0.56*** 0.53*** 
 (28.07) (26.49) 
Not S&P 500 -0.03** -0.02 
 (-1.99) (-1.17) 
Credit rating 0.33*** 0.32*** 
 (28.64) (27.88) 
Multiple business segments 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (5.80) (5.42) 
Single business segments 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (13.22) (13.29) 
Multiple geographical segments 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 (44.72) (44.66) 
Single  geographical segments 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (10.45) (10.28) 
   
   
Pseudo R2 (%) 31.2% 31.3% 
Observations 4,965,950 4,965,950 
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Table 3 
Decomposition of the peer pay effect 
This table reports the results of decomposing the peer pay effect (PPE) into two components: CEO talent 
and self-serving behavior. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the peer pay effects, CEO talent measures, and 
self-serving proxies. Panel B presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations between these variables in the lower (upper) 
diagonal. Panel C presents the results of regressing PPE on contemporaneous measures of CEO talent and the self-
serving proxies. The variables are defined as follows. PPE_FY (%) [PPE_FY ($)] is percentage (dollar value) 
difference between “actual peer pay” and “propensity-score-matched peer pay” using the FY model. Actual peer pay 
is the natural logarithm of the median Pay of the firm’s chosen peers. Propensity-score-matched peer pay is the 
natural logarithm of the median Pay of the firm’s “matched” peers, i.e., a sample of companies that are more likely 
to be peers based on the Table 2 peer-choice prediction model. PPE_BLN (%) [PPE_BLN ($)] is the same as above 
but calculated using the BLN model. CEO abn ROA is the average of the firm’s stock return measured relative to the 
industry ROA over the last three years. This variable is calculated using the ROA of the firm for which the CEO was 
working, irrelevant of whether he or she was then serving as CEO. CEO abn ret is the average of the firm’s stock 
return measured relative to the S&P 500 index over the last three years, irrelevant of whether he or she was then 
serving as CEO. CEO log market cap is the natural logarithm of the average market value of equity of the firms that 
the CEO worked for over the last three years, irrelevant of whether he or she was then serving as CEO. Log media 
coverage is the log of the number of articles containing the CEO’s name and the firm’s name that appear in the 
major business newspapers, as identified through searches of the Factiva database. Small peer group is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the peer group size is smaller than the median, zero otherwise. Busy board is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the number of other boards on which the firm directors serve is above the sample median, 
zero otherwise. Board hired after CEO is an indicator variable equal to one if the fraction of the board that was hired 
after the CEO took office is larger than the sample median, zero otherwise. Small board size is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the number of board members is smaller than the sample median, zero otherwise. Board variables are 
obtained from the RiskMetrics database. High GIM index is an indicator variable equal to one if the GIM index 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) is greater than the sample median. Small institutional ownership is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the percentage of the firm’s equity held by institutional investors is smaller than the sample 
median, zero otherwise. Small insider ownership is an indicator variable equal to one if the total percentage of the 
firm’s equity held by the firm insiders (top five executives) is smaller than the sample median, zero otherwise. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-sided) levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
       
     Percentile  
Variable N Mean Std. dev. 5th Median 95th 
       
PPE_FY (%) 2,836 0.133 0.535 -0.715 0.129 0.986 
PPE_FY ($) 2,836 896.1 3,661.2 -3,426.4 552.3 6,333.4 
PPE_BLN (%) 2,836 0.037 0.487 -0.725 0.037 0.775 
PPE_BLN ($) 2,836 462.8 3,032.9 -3,138.3 156.4 4,707.5 
CEO abn ROA 2,836 0.045 0.090 -0.047 0.027 0.252 
CEO abn ret 2,836 0.094 0.2251 -0.205 0.063 0.508 
CEO log market cap 2,836 8.047 1.477 5.892 7.892 10.760 
Log media coverage 2,836 1.300 1.277 0 1.099 3.807 
Small peer group 2,477 0.579 0.494 0 1 1 
Busy board 2,477 0.486 0.500 0 0 1 
Board hired after CEO 2,477 0.497 0.500 0 0 1 
Small board size 2,477 0.488 0.500 0 0 1 
High GIM index 2,477 0.463 0.499 0 0 1 
Small institutional ownership 2,477 0.496 0.500 0 0 1 
Small insider ownership 2,477 0.524 0.499 0 1 1 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
              
 
PPE 
_FY 
PPE 
_BLN 
CEO  
abn  
ROA 
CEO  
abn  
ret 
CEO log 
 market 
 cap 
Log  
media 
coverage 
Small  
peer  
group 
Busy 
 board 
Board  
hired  
after CEO
Small 
board  
size 
 
High  
GIM  
index 
Small 
institutional 
ownership 
Small 
insider 
ownership
              
PPE_FY 1 0.440* 0.002 0.079* 0.088* 0.101* 0.012 0.111* 0.018 0.030 -0.022 -0.039* -0.019 
PPE_BLN 0.443* 1 0.026 0.077* 0.130* 0.094* 0.003 0.075* 0.057* 0.031 0.002 -0.036* -0.007 
CEO abn ROA 0.015 -0.003 1 0.098* 0.185* 0.049* -0.044* 0.069* -0.004 0.091* -0.034 -0.095* -0.030 
CEO abn ret 0.065* 0.072* 0.083* 1 0.039* -0.026 -0.032 0.019 0.067* -0.001 0.006 -0.070* 0.028 
CEO log market cap 0.161* 0.169* 0.238* 0.008 1 0.560* -0.057* 0.339* -0.041* -0.418* 0.002 0.280* 0.417* 
Log media coverage 0.127* 0.109* 0.055* -0.023 0.605* 1 -0.020 0.302* -0.029 -0.257* -0.024 0.124* 0.250* 
Small peer group -0.009 -0.026 -0.001 0.027 -0.066* -0.033* 1 -0.085* 0.039* 0.070* -0.077* -0.051* -0.073* 
Busy board 0.090* 0.059* 0.076* -0.028 0.362* 0.316* -0.093* 1 -0.000 -0.189* 0.057* 0.032 0.187* 
Board hired after CEO 0.005 0.056* 0.021 0.069* -0.043* -0.020 0.036* 0.004 1 0.058* -0.051* -0.047* -0.160* 
Small board size 0.012 0.013 0.030 0.027 -0.439* -0.279* 0.080* -0.191* 0.065* 1 -0.152* -0.315* -0.310* 
High GIM index -0.025 0.003 0.000 -0.014 -0.020 -0.041* -0.086* 0.059* -0.054* -0.153* 1 0.079* 0.074* 
Small institutional ownership -0.039* -0.034* -0.049* -0.060* 0.236* -0.166* -0.046* 0.034* -0.039* -0.310* 0.062* 1 0.226* 
Small insider ownership 0.011 0.019 0.044* 0.013 0.427* 0.250* -0.077* 0.185* -0.167* -0.317* 0.086* 0.195* 1 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Regression of the peer pay effect on CEO talent and corporate governance  
 
        
 FY specification BLN specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
CEO abn ROA -0.16  -0.26** -0.29***  -0.31*** 
 (-1.27)  (-1.99) (-2.79)  (-2.85) 
CEO abn ret 0.16***  0.17*** 0.16***  0.17*** 
 (3.47)  (3.07) (3.73)  (3.23) 
CEO log market cap 0.05***  0.05*** 0.06***  0.06*** 
 (4.37)  (3.30) (5.81)  (5.95) 
Log media coverage 0.02  0.02* 0.00  0.00 
 (1.54)  (1.70) (0.29)  (0.30) 
Small peer group  0.01 0.01  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.48) (0.24)  (-0.46) (-0.52) 
Busy board  0.11*** 0.07***  0.05*** 0.01 
  (4.95) (2.98)  (2.72) (0.69) 
Board hired after CEO  -0.01 -0.01  0.05** 0.04** 
  (-0.37) (-0.49)  (2.57) (2.13) 
Small board size  0.04 0.08***  0.02 0.08*** 
  (1.35) (2.84)  (0.90) (3.41) 
High GIM index  -0.01 -0.00  -0.00 0.02 
  (-0.56) (-0.04)  (-0.11) (0.71) 
Small institutional ownership  -0.03 -0.05**  -0.03 -0.05** 
  (-1.28) (-2.05)  (-1.14) (-2.42) 
Small insider ownership  -0.02 -0.07**  -0.00 -0.05** 
  (-0.86) (-2.47)  (-0.20) (-2.00) 
        
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.09 1.15 3.36 3.47 0.60 3.90 
Observations 2,836 2,477 2,316 2,836 2,477 2,316 
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Table 4 
Analysis of the peer pay effect on future performance 
This table reports the results of regressing firms’ future accounting performance (Future ROA) and future 
stock returns (Future ret) on the predicted and self-serving peer pay effect components obtained from the Panel C 
regressions of Table 3, while controlling for variables expected to explain performance, including industry and year 
effects. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Panels B and C present 
the regression results. The variables are defined as follows. PPE-Talent1 and PPE-Talent3 are the predicted 
components using the estimated coefficients on the talent proxies obtained from regressions of PPE on talent 
proxies only, and both talent and self-serving proxies, respectively (from Eq. (2)). PPE-Talent2 is the residual 
component of regressing PPE on self-serving proxies only. PPE-Self serving1 is the residual component of 
regressing PPE on talent proxies only. PPE-Self serving2 and PPE-Self serving3 are the predicted components using 
the estimated coefficients on the self-serving proxies obtained from regressions of PPE on self-serving proxies only, 
and both talent and self-serving proxies, respectively. The _FY (_BLN) suffix is added to the peer pay effect (PPE) 
variables that are measured using the FY (BLN) model. Future ROA is the one-year-ahead ROA, defined as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Future ret is stock returns including dividends measured 
over the 12-month period starting at the end of the fiscal year. Sales is total revenue measured at the end of the fiscal 
year. Log STD ROA is the log of the standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA) calculated over the prior five 
years. Log market cap is the log of market value of equity measured at the end of the year. Log STD ret is the log of 
the standard deviation of stock returns including dividends (Ret) calculated over the prior five years. Book-market 
ratio is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. The talent and self-serving peer pay 
components are standardized by using its cumulative distribution function (noted by Cdf). Coefficients in Panel C 
are multiplied by 100. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-sided) levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
       
     Percentile  
Variable N Mean Std. dev. 5th Median 95th 
       
PPE-Talent1_FY 2,158 0.140 0.092 0.002 0.130 0.310 
PPE-Talent2_FY 2,158 0.007 0.505 -0.793 -0.004 0.837 
PPE-Talent3_FY 2,158 0.413 0.092 0.276 0.402 0.583 
PPE-Self serving1_FY 2,158 -0.002 0.506 -0.805 -0.014 0.836 
PPE-Self serving2_FY 2,158 0.132 0.061 0.028 0.129 0.232 
PPE-Self serving3_FY 2,158 0.008 0.076 -0.125 0.010 0.146 
PPE-Talent1_BLN 2,158 0.044 0.089 -0.094 0.038 0.202 
PPE-Talent2_BLN 2,158 0.007 0.438 -0.705 -0.002 0.706 
PPE-Talent3_BLN 2,158 0.526 0.097 0.377 0.520 0.701 
PPE-Self serving1_BLN 2,158 0.008 0.435 -0.680 -0.003 0.728 
PPE-Self serving2_BLN 2,158 0.045 0.041 -0.027 0.044 0.119 
PPE-Self serving3_BLN 2,158 0.016 0.070 -0.087 0.015 0.128 
Future ROA 2,158 0.776 2.599 -3.548 0.992 3.826 
Future ret 2,158 4.023 81.36 -66.41 -5.163 92.25 
Sales 2,158 0.010 0.027 0.000 0.003 0.038 
Log STD ROA 2,158 1.205 0.729 0.197 1.110 2.585 
Log market cap 2,158 8.100 1.529 5.754 7.977 10.75 
Log STD ret 2,158 0.280 0.219 0. 094 0.248 0.546 
Book-market ratio 2,158 0.605 0.799 0.129 0.475 1.462 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable = Future ROA 
 
          
 FY specification  BLN specification
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Cdf PPE -0.19     0.07    
 (-0.94)     (0.29)    
Cdf PPE-Talent1  1.31***     1.28***   
  (4.95)     (4.32)   
Cdf PPE-Talent2   -0.14     0.09  
   (-0.71)     (0.38)  
Cdf PPE-Talent3    0.91***     1.13***
    (2.97)     (3.30) 
Cdf PPE-Self serving1  -0.35*     -0.14   
  (-1.84)     (-0.62)   
Cdf PPE-Self serving2   -0.46*     -0.28  
   (-1.88)     (-1.11)  
Cdf PPE-Self serving3    -0.77***     -0.49 
    (-2.75)     (-1.58) 
Sales 5.52*** -0.43 6.05*** 0.15  5.25*** -0.34 5.43*** -0.93 
 (3.04) (-0.22) (3.11) (0.07)  (2.87) (-0.17) (2.99) (-0.47) 
Log STD ROA -0.49*** -0.46*** -0.48*** -0.46***  -0.50*** -0.46*** -0.50*** -0.46***
 (-3.06) (-2.81) (-3.04) (-2.91)  (-3.13) (-2.84) (-3.12) (-2.82) 
          
Adjusted R2 (%) 11.99 13.74 12.15 13.52  11.96 13.47 12.01 13.67 
Observations 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158  2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable = Future ret 
 
          
 FY specification BLN specification 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Cdf PPE 4.05    8.77**    
 (1.03)    (2.43)    
Cdf PPE-Talent1  97.68**    105.45***   
  (2.54)    (2.68)   
Cdf PPE-Talent2   3.41    9.03**  
   (0.87)    (2.53)  
Cdf PPE-Talent3    79.02***    107.07***
    (2.59)    (2.69) 
Cdf PPE-Self serving1  1.59    2.78   
  (0.42)    (0.60)   
Cdf PPE-Self serving2   5.73    8.18  
   (1.34)    (1.51)  
Cdf PPE-Self serving3    -13.49    -14.65 
    (-1.46)    (-1.42) 
Log market cap -4.80 -22.07** -4.93 -19.02** -4.95 -23.25** -5.07 -24.87**
 (-1.16) (-2.05) (-1.18) (-1.98) (-1.21) (-2.14) (-1.22) (-2.12) 
Log STD ret -0.35 -13.36 -0.77 -11.03 -0.56 -14.96 -1.50 -13.19 
 (-0.08) (-1.17) (-0.17) (-1.14) (-0.12) (-1.28) (-0.32) (-1.23) 
Book-market ratio 16.70 13.39 16.68 13.74 16.60 13.39 16.69 12.73 
 (0.98) (0.75) (0.98) (0.77) (0.98) (0.75) (0.98) (0.70) 
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 21.67 23.93 21.66 23.57 21.74 24.15 21.78 24.40 
Observations 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 
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Table 5 
Analysis of the peer pay effect on CEO compensation 
This table reports the results of regression models predicting firms’ future CEO total compensation (Future 
log pay) using various measures of peer pay and controlling for economic factors expected to explain compensation. 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Panel B presents the regression 
results. The variables are defined as follows. (Log) Pay is (the natural logarithm of) TDC1 in the ExecuComp 
database. (Log) Peer pay is the (natural logarithm of the) median of Pay of the firm’s selected peers (i.e., measured 
at the firm i level). (Log) Peer pay matched is the (natural logarithm of the) median Pay of the firm’s propensity-
score-matched peers, i.e., a sample of companies that are more likely to be peers based on the Column 1 of Table 2 
peer-choice prediction model. PPE is the percentage difference between “actual peer pay” and “propensity-score-
matched peer pay,” where these are defined as follows. Actual peer pay is the natural logarithm of the median Pay 
of the firm’s chosen peers. Expected peer pay is the natural logarithm of the median Pay of the firm’s “propensity-
score-matched peer pay” peers. The _FY (_BLN) suffix is added to the peer pay variables that are measured using 
the FY (BLN) model. Log sales is the natural logarithm of total sales revenue measured at the end of the year. Ret 
(Lag ret) is stock returns including dividends measured over the 12-month period ending at the end (beginning) of 
the fiscal year. ∆ROA is the change in net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets measured at the 
end of fiscal year. Lag market-book assets is the ratio of the market value of assets (book value of assets-common 
equity+ total market capitalization) to the book value of total assets. Lag log STD ret is lag of the natural logarithm 
of the standard deviation of stock returns including dividends (Ret) calculated over the prior five years. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-sided) levels, respectively.  
 
       
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
       
     Percentile  
Variable N Mean Std. dev. 5th Median 95th 
       
Pay 2,158 6,778 7,996 1003 4,593 19,804 
Log pay 2,158 8.406 0.911 6.912 8.433 9.894 
Peer pay 2,158 6,289 4,394 1,616 5,096 14,826 
Log peer pay 2,158 8.527 0.673 7.388 8.536 9.604 
Peer pay matched _FY 2,158 5,401 3,715 1,512 4,418 12,944 
Log peer pay matched _FY 2,158 8.388 0.649 7.322 8.394 9.468 
PPE_FY 2,158 0.138 0.509 -0.669 0.127 0.972 
Peer pay matched_BLN 2,158 5,796 3,812 1,712 4,744 13,422 
Log peer pay matched_BLN 2,158 8.475 0.623 7.446 8.465 9.505 
PPE_BLN 2,158 0.052 0.440 -0.667 0.042 0.753 
Log sales 2,158 7.914 1.461 5.645 7.798 10.489 
Ret 2,158 -0.057 0.367 -0.644 -0.059 0.525 
Lag ret 2,158 0.115 0.324 -0.336 0.085 0.666 
∆ROA 2,158 -0.017 0.088 -0.134 -0.002 0.055 
Lag market-book assets  2,158 1.894 1.055 1.011 1.590 3.831 
Lag log STD ret 2,158 0.288 0.285 0.087 0.240 0.599 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regressions 
 
            
  FY specification  BLN specification
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
            
Log peer pay 0.38***          
 (8.54)          
Cdf PPE  0.61***     0.53***    
  (8.53)     (8.51)    
Cdf PPE-Talent1   1.15***     1.11***   
   (10.68)     (10.08)   
Cdf PPE-Talent2    0.60***     0.52***  
    (8.59)     (8.38)  
Cdf PPE-Talent3     1.18***     1.26*** 
     (11.57)     (11.23) 
Cdf PPE-Self serving1   0.42***     0.37***   
   (5.98)     (6.10)   
Cdf PPE-Self serving2    0.33***     0.33***  
    (5.36)     (5.64)  
Cdf PPE-Self serving3     0.14**     0.18** 
     (2.05)     (2.52) 
Cdf Peer pay matched  0.72*** 0.39*** 0.75*** -0.00  0.72*** 0.42*** 0.73*** 0.07 
  (6.72) (3.68) (7.00) (-0.03)  (6.55) (3.80) (6.72) (0.83) 
Log sales 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 0.27***  0.33*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 
 (14.52) (15.74) (8.49) (15.23) (11.60)  (15.09) (8.64) (14.97) (10.11) 
Ret 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.23***  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
 (5.28) (5.05) (5.08) (5.17) (4.89)  (5.28) (5.32) (5.26) (4.95) 
Lag ret 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.15*** 0.26*** 0.13***  0.27*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.14*** 
 (5.41) (5.32) (3.23) (5.37) (2.75)  (5.61) (3.32) (5.64) (3.06) 
∆ROA 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.16  0.05 0.10 0.08 0.14 
 (0.29) (0.49) (1.07) (0.61) (0.95)  (0.31) (0.67) (0.47) (0.87) 
Lag market-book assets  0.06*** 0.07*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.01  0.06*** -0.00 0.06*** -0.01 
 (3.60) (3.82) (-0.45) (3.68) (0.43)  (3.59) (-0.27) (3.37) (-0.51) 
Lag log STD ret 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01  0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 
 (1.08) (1.12) (0.34) (0.73) (0.10)  (1.27) (0.42) (0.68) (0.17) 
            
            
Adjusted R2 (%) 55.66 55.61 58.07 56.16 57.18  55.62 57.88 56.32 57.18 
Observations 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158  2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests: alternative specifications 
Panel A (B) of this table replicates the results in Panel C of Table 3 (Panel B of Table 5) using additional 
talent and corporate governance controls. Past CEO pay is the sum of total pay for the years of t-1, t-2, and t-3. CEO 
fixed effect and Firm fixed effect are obtained following the procedure developed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999) estimated out-of-sample for a sample of ExecuComp executive-firms from 1993 to 2005. CEO chair is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, zero otherwise. Long 
tenured CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the executive has been a CEO at the firm for more than 5.5 
years (the sample median), zero otherwise. S&P 500 firm is equal to one if the firm belongs to the S&P 500 index. 
Governance controls, not tabulated, are the firm’s return volatility, book leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), 
R&D scaled by total assets, market-to-book value of assets, and the number of business segments in which the firm 
operates. Remaining variables are defined in Tables 3 and 5. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics with standard 
errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
(two-sided) levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel A: Peer-pay-effect decomposition 
 
          
 FY specification  BLN specification 
 Lag  pay 
CEO 
FE 
FY/BLN 
variables
Gov.  
controls 
 Lag  
pay 
CEO 
FE 
FY/BLN 
variables
Gov.  
controls 
CEO abn ROA -0.25** -0.34** -0.27** -0.14  -0.27** -0.30** -0.30*** -0.43***
 (-1.96) (-2.00) (-1.97) (-0.98)  (-2.47) (-2.24) (-2.78) (-3.65) 
CEO abn ret 0.15*** 0.12* 0.21*** 0.16**  0.17*** 0.12* 0.19*** 0.13** 
 (2.63) (1.68) (3.70) (2.49)  (2.92) (1.67) (3.56) (2.26) 
CEO log market cap -0.02 0.02 0.09*** 0.07***  0.03* 0.04** 0.09*** 0.07***
 (-1.25) (1.15) (5.23) (4.44)  (1.83) (2.53) (6.74) (6.45) 
Log media coverage 0.00 -0.01 0.02* 0.01  -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.28) (-0.58) (1.69) (1.06)  (-0.28) (0.45) (0.31) (-0.11) 
Past CEO pay 0.18***     0.10***    
 (7.07)     (4.27)    
CEO fixed effect  0.06***     0.03*   
  (2.62)     (1.94)   
Firm fixed effect  0.06***     0.02   
  (3.16)     (1.52)   
Small peer group 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.50) (0.43) (-0.07) (0.22)  (-0.37) (-0.77) (-0.85) (-0.26) 
Busy board 0.04 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06**  -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (1.55) (2.74) (2.96) (2.40)  (-0.10) (0.22) (0.31) (-0.01) 
Board hired after -0.05* -0.04 0.01 -0.02  0.02 0.03 0.05** 0.03* 
   CEO (-1.79) (-1.18) (0.31) (-0.91)  (1.18) (1.15) (2.07) (1.72) 
Small board size 0.08*** 0.06* 0.07** 0.07**  0.08*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.06***
 (2.72) (1.84) (2.55) (2.34)  (3.35) (3.23) (3.04) (2.59) 
High GIM index 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.23) (0.87) (0.54) (0.56)  (1.24) (0.89) (0.92) (1.23) 
Small institutional -0.02 -0.01 -0.05* -0.05**  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05** -0.05** 
   ownership (-0.80) (-0.36) (-1.94) (-2.07)  (-1.63) (-1.27) (-2.35) (-2.25) 
Small insider -0.04 -0.02 -0.07** -0.08***  -0.03 -0.01 -0.05** -0.05** 
   ownership (-1.42) (-0.56) (-2.27) (-2.69)  (-1.36) (-0.29) (-2.03) (-2.02) 
CEO chair   -0.07**     -0.01  
   (-2.27)     (-0.27)  
Long tenured CEO   0.00     -0.01  
   (0.07)     (-0.25)  
S&P 500 firm   -0.15***     -0.09***  
   (-4.05)     (-3.04)  
Governance controls  No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
          
          
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.23 3.36 4.50 4.66  5.59 2.47 4.46 5.06 
Observations 2,165 1,362 2,217 2,316  2,165 1,362 2,217 2,316 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Compensation regressions 
 
          
 FY specification  BLN specification
 Lag  
pay 
CEO 
FE 
FY/BLN 
variables 
Gov.  
controls  
Lag  
pay 
CEO 
FE 
FY/BLN 
variables 
Gov.  
controls 
          
Cdf PPE-Talent3 1.48*** 0.42*** 1.48*** 1.38***  1.87*** 0.83*** 1.46*** 1.25*** 
 (19.86) (4.65) (12.07) (11.83)  (21.37) (6.90) (11.85) (10.95) 
Cdf PPE-Self serving3 -0.07 0.07 0.19** 0.18***  -0.05 -0.05 0.26*** 0.17** 
 (-1.30) (1.02) (2.15) (2.59)  (-0.79) (-0.55) (2.98) (2.41) 
Cdf Peer pay matched 0.08 0.24** -0.02 -0.05  -0.06 0.23** -0.02 0.08 
 (1.07) (2.07) (-0.19) (-0.66)  (-0.74) (2.07) (-0.23) (0.87) 
Log sales 0.26*** 0.38*** 0.23*** 0.24***  0.17*** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
 (15.36) (14.62) (8.63) (9.32)  (7.83) (9.62) (9.22) (9.98) 
Ret 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.23***  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 
 (5.72) (3.91) (5.64) (4.91)  (5.81) (4.00) (5.62) (5.20) 
Lag ret 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.17***  0.11** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 
 (3.47) (3.59) (3.42) (3.60)  (2.28) (3.32) (3.48) (4.07) 
∆ROA 0.18 -0.04 0.27* 0.17  0.18 0.01 0.25 0.08 
 (1.14) (-0.21) (1.69) (1.07)  (1.24) (0.03) (1.57) (0.53) 
Lag market-book assets 0.05*** 0.10*** -0.02 -0.03  -0.01 0.07*** -0.02 0.01 
 (3.72) (4.04) (-1.04) (-1.61)  (-0.79) (2.84) (-1.09) (0.40) 
Lag log STD ret -0.07 -0.00 0.01 0.03  -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (-1.17) (-0.04) (0.19) (0.54)  (-1.16) (-0.46) (0.10) (0.47) 
          
          
Adjusted R2 (%) 65.45 57.64 57.98 57.36  65.80 59.11 57.79 57.09 
Observations 2,020 1,279 2,064 2,158  2,020 1,279 2,064 2,158 
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Table 7 
Analysis over time of the peer pay effect on CEO compensation 
This table replicates the results in Table 5 for each of the three years after the SEC’s new disclosure rules 
became effective on December 15th, 2006. Panel A (B) presents the regression results using the FY (BLN) model 
specification. All control variables from the Table 5 analysis are included in the regression but not tabulated. 
Observations are at the firm-year level. Variables are defined in Table 5. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics with 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% (two-sided) levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: FY specification 
 
        
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Cdf PPE 0.54*** 0.49*** 0.76***     
 (4.67) (4.81) (6.88)     
Cdf PPE-Talent3     0.82*** 1.24*** 0.88*** 
     (6.18) (7.04) (6.76) 
Cdf PPE-Self serving3     0.01 0.31*** 0.13 
     (0.15) (3.43) (1.62) 
Cdf Peer pay predicted 0.68*** 0.44*** 0.94***  0.14 -0.15 0.09 
 (4.23) (2.72) (4.67)  (1.29) (-1.14) (0.58) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
        
Adjusted R2 (%) 57.50 54.98 51.70  58.64 56.78 51.87 
Observations 728 792 753  728 792 753 
        
 
 
Panel B: BLN specification 
 
        
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Cdf PPE 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.72***     
 (4.17) (5.25) (7.13)     
Cdf PPE-Talent3     0.92*** 0.95*** 1.59*** 
     (6.23) (5.79) (9.68) 
Cdf PPE-Self serving3     -0.11 0.19** 0.30*** 
     (-1.12) (2.23) (2.82) 
Cdf Peer pay predicted 0.55*** 0.62*** 1.07***  0.04 0.08 0.22 
 (3.23) (3.70) (5.58)  (0.32) (0.53) (1.31) 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
        
Adjusted R2 (%) 57.20 55.34 52.35  58.68 55.66 54.31 
Observations 728 792 753  728 792 753 
        
 
 
 
